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Abstract
The recent astonishing wide adhesion of french people to the ru-
mor claiming ‘No plane did crash on the Pentagon on September the
11”, is given a generic explanation in terms of a model of minority
opinion spreading. Using a majority rule reaction-diffusion dynamics,
a rumor is shown to invade for sure a social group provided it fulfills
simultaneously two criteria. First it must initiate with a support be-
yond some critical threshold which however, turns out to be always
very low. Then it has to be consistent with some larger collective
social paradigm of the group. Othewise it just dies out. Both condi-
tions were satisfied in the french case with the associated book sold at
more than 200 000 copies in just a few days. The rumor was stopped
by the firm stand of most newspaper editors stating it is nonsense.
Such an incredible social dynamics is shown to result naturally from
an open and free public debate among friends and colleagues. Each
one searching for the truth sincerely on a free will basis and without
individual biases. The polarization process appears also to be very
quick in agreement with reality. It is a very strong anti-democratic
reversal of opinion although made quite democratically. The model
may apply to a large range of rumors.
∗Laboratoire associe´ au CNRS (UMR n◦ 7603), galam@ccr.jussieu.fr
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1 Introduction
Very recently, the assertion from an individual stating indeed there were no
crash plane on the Pentagon on September the 11, received in France an
unprecedented massive adhesion notwithstanding the obvious nonsense of
the assertion. Within a few days more than two hundred thousands copies
of his book [1] were sold. Every one was debating the issue with millions
of people adhering to the lie. To stop this overloading of misinformation,
all newspaper leader-editors made firm stand on denouncing unanimously an
ashamed and unacceptable make-up of reality [2]. A counter book with a
detailed proof of the Pentagon attack was even published [3].
But since then, all has been forgotten, or almost. No one is any longer
interested in the issue. But yet this astonishing event may prove useful to
grasp the complex dynamics behind the more general and broad phenomenon
denoted under the generic name of rumor [4]. It offers an opportunity to
analyze the process of individual choice making from public and open dis-
cussions. In particular it allows to connect the effect of backmind collective
social paradigms in yielding the direction of a public opinion polarization.
The subject of rumor formation is becoming of a strategic importance
at all levels of society. The control and possible handling to manipulate in-
formation are now major issues in social organizations including economy,
politics, defense, fashion, and even personal affairs. Especially with the exis-
tence of Internet which provides a support to anybody to say anything and
then consequently to be possibly heard by millions of people. To be read can
imply to be automatically perceived like truth, and retransmitted as such to
others. There exist no parapets.
However, information shared by a very great number of people does not
obviously prove of anything its authenticity. But it can induce quite concrete
and sometimes dangerous follow up acts. It may also happen that once a
point of view on some specific issue is widely adopted, the presentation of
objective facts proving its falseness, does not produce the abandonment from
this same false point of view. At contrast, a rumor can prove to be true while
first set false by official media. The frontier between a rumor and information
turns out to be very fragile [4].
To try to put on some new light on this rather complicated phenomenon,
we evoke a recent study on minority spreading in random geometries [5].
Using a majority rule reaction - diffusion model, its shows how an opinion
at the extremely minority beginning propagates in a random geometry of
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social meetings. It is found to always gain an overwhelmed majority in a
group provided it starts beyond a certain very low threshold value [5, 6], if
it is also coherent with some social paradigm. Otherwise it dies out. The
associated dynamics appears to be extremely quick (few days) in both cases
of total spreading of dying out in accordance with empirical fact about rumor
phenomena [4].
It is worth to stress that above model is not the reality itself. But it
aims by making crude approximations at discovering certain essential and
radical aspects of this very reality which are otherwise totally hidden by the
complexity of the full phenomenon. Such a sociophysics treatment [7] of a
social problem is symptomatic of a new emerging trend from physicists of
disorder [8-13].
The paper is organized as follows. The chronology and the content of the
Pentagon french hoax are first reviewed in Section 2. In Section 3 we present
the minority model [5]. It is then applied to the french case in Section 4.
The massive and quick adhesion of french people to the no plane Pentagon
hoax is shown to result from an existing collective anti-American bias which
is independent of the issue itself [14]. The same mechanism explains why the
hoax did not spread in other country like for instance England. To conclude,
the existence of systematic collective bias active in the forming of public
opinion is emphasized in last Section.
2 The Pentagon french hoax
On September the 11 all french media as like all other world media announces
the news ”a plane has crashed on the Pentagon” in the series of the terrorist
attacks on the US. The fact is naturally perceived as an objective truth.
No one questioned it? There were no doubt what so ever about the fact
itself. Nevertheless, its reality could have proven disturbing for some people,
as far as their global ideological worldview was concerned. For those who
hold America as a satanic and very powerful country, this barbarian and
unacceptable aggression against the same America deeply disturbed their
global vision of the world. They had to live with it.
But then, when later on an isolated individual starts diffusing on the
Net his counter truth, ”not only has no plane crashed on the Pentagon, but
moreover the blow was assembled by the United States”, all above unease
people absorbed this counter truth at once and literally like a saving truth.
4
For them, America was indeed the beforehand well-presented monster. This
coming back to coherent ideological world view certainly acts on tens of
thousands of French people. The selling of more than 200 000 copies of the
hoax claiming book in less tahan few days demonstrated such an immediate
release for a huge amount of french people.
However, even if up to twenty percent of the french population was im-
mediately adhering to the lie, its immense majority, that is to say eighty
percent, was felt not concerned with this ”revelation”. For them, it was
at best perceived more like a sectarian wild imagining. The phenomenon
remained contained and confidential, though with a hard core of believers.
But afterwards, the TV came in to mediate the issue. It has played a key
role in the following warming up process of tuning on a generalized public
debate. There, one of the major national french TV channels presented at
a large audience show the untruth as a new possible scenario to explain the
Pentagon destruction. The thesis of no plane crash was defended together
with the claim it was set up by american secret services. This presentation
was not put on as the truth but as an alternative to the current view on
the event. De facto, it created a doubt in the public mind. From there, the
questioning of the event was legitimated at least as a doubt about the nature
of what did really happen to the Pentagon on September the 11.
In addition, the sounding right of the question ”why they are no pictures
of the carcass plane on the Pentagon”, drove an unbearable doubt. The
hugeness of this revelation made it a necessity for the people to clear up
the issue at stake. Consequently, a public debate started as the essential
medium to resolve the mystery. Moreover, as the response to the absence
of plane carcass was counter-intuitive, once someone made up its mind from
discussing with friends or colleagues, it could always been shaken again in its
view. The fragility of the individual making choice has resulted in a series of
local and repeated discussions. The truth was perceived as emerging from the
making of a collective truth setting up the facts within a clear explanation.
It was up to the public opinion to decide what had actually occurred at the
Pentagon on September the 11.
Nevertheless, it could have been expected that starting with a majority
of eighty percent of the population holding on the truth ”a plane has crashed
on the Pentagon”, the public debate would automatically lead to enforce the
truth on the initial twenty percent of people believing on the untruth ”no
crush plane on the Pentagon, it was set up by american secret services”. But
in fact, and in an astonishing manner, the opposite did happen. The lying
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minority did turn on its side the majority of the people first holding on the
truth.
3 The minority spreading model
To understand above paradox, let us follow the process of an individual
searching for the truth from open and repeated discussions with friends and
colleagues. Discussing this kind of issue occurs at social gatherings at which
people chat freely about any matter like the weather, a sport event or some
news. These gatherings take place at most at social times like coffee breaks,
lunches, or dinners. At each one of them, a small number of people get
together, usually from two to six or a bit more, to enjoy a drink or some
food. There, while discussing, arguing and drinking, often the whole small
group lines up within a more or less consensual opinion [4, 5]. However this
opinion is fragile since resulting from an informal discussion and not from
an irrefutable demonstration. As such it is suitable for a shift at another
meeting. People have no individual bias towards the issue.
To visualize the phenomenon in a simple manner, we consider a perfect
society where each individual has only one and even power of conviction,
whether it is for or against the truth. To be more perfect we also make the
assumption that each individual taken in a local discussion eventually aligns
along the position of the initial majority within the actual group. Thus, from
each group sitting, informal discussion leads to a local consensus with each
participant sharing the same opinion, that is the one of the initial majority.
After the dinner, lunch or drink, everyone is convinced of either the truth
or the untruth. That is because people are sincere and open mind in their
search to answering the question of what did happen to the Pentagon on
September the 11. They hold no a priori.
To moderate this local majority rule dynamics, we introduce the possibil-
ity for a group to doubt about the issue. In our model such doubting states
result spontaneously from even groups with an initial local parity between
the two opposite opinions. In this case, while doubting from their respective
individual arguments, the people need some extra information to establish a
choice. That additional ingredient is naturally sought in the shared collec-
tive social paradigms which are specific to the overall population the group
members belonged to. These common cultural settings are upstream of any
particular consideration. They are a common sensitivity about wide view of
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the world. Here, for the french population taken as a whole, it spurs from a
rather skeptical feeling about America. Thus in case of a doubt, the group
chooses to believe in the untruth since it is coherent to its common back-
ground of suspicion towards the United States [14]. An illustration of the
dynamical process is showed in Figure 1.
It is worth to stress that in another country this collective backmind can
be different. For instance in England it is a rather American sympathizing
feeling. Thus, there the same group in the same doubt would decide to
believe in the reality of the crash. As is seen below, that is why in England
the rumor just died out.
Within the framework of our model, to have a quantitative grasp on the
discussion driven evolution of the respective proportions of people holding
on the truth and the untruth, it is necessary to fix ratios for the various
social-meeting sizes. Denoting {ai} the probability to be sitting at a group
of size i, we have the constraint,
L∑
i=1
ai = 1, (1)
where i = 1, 2, ..., L. The including of one-person groups makes the assump-
tion everyone is gathering simultaneously realistic.
Starting at time t from a N person population, prior to the public debate
everyone is holding an opinion. There are N+(t) individuals believing to
the truth “A plane did crash on the Pentagon on September the 11”, leaving
N
−
(t) persons sharing the untruth “No plane crashed on the Pentagon”, with
N+(t) +N−(t) = N . Therefore the probabilities to hold respectively on the
truth or the untruth are,
P+(t) =
N+(t)
N
, (2)
and,
P
−
(t) = 1− P+(t). (3)
From this initial configuration, people start discussing the issue at the
first social meeting. Each new cycle of multi-size discussions is marked by
a time increment +1. From above simple assumption of a majority rule
dynamics, with a bias in favor of the untruth in case of a local doubt, at time
(t+ 1) we get for the density truth support,
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Empty social spaces Social gathering
Before discussion
Social gathering
After discussion
Individual sharing a negative view
Individual sharing a positive view
Figure 1: A one step social gathering dynamics. Up left, people sharing
the two opinions are moving around. Grey are for and black are against.
No discussion is occurring with 28 grey and 9 black. Upper right, people
are having lunch by groups of various sizes from one to six. They start
discussing. Nooen yet change its mind. Below left, people are ending their
lunch. Consensus has been reached within each group. As a result, they are
now 23 grey and 14 black. Below right, people are again moving around with
no discussion. The balance stays at 23/14.
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P+(t+ 1) =
L∑
k=1
ak
k∑
j=N [ k
2
+1]
Ckj P+(t)
j{1− P+(t)}
(k−j), (4)
where Ckj ≡
k!
(k−j)!j!
and N [k
2
+ 1] ≡ IntegerPart of (k
2
+ 1).
In the course of time, the same people will meet again and again randomly
in the same cluster configuration of size groups (see Fig. 1). At each new
encounter they discuss locally the issue at stake and may change their mind
according to above majority rule applied to each local group. To follow the
time evolution of the truth support, Eq. (4) is iterated again and again.
A monotonic flow is obtained towards either one of two stable fixed points
P0 = 0 and P1 = 1. The flow and its direction are produced by an unstable
fixed point PK located between P0 and P1. Its value depends on both the
{ai} and L. We denote it the Killing Point.
For P+(t) < PK it exists a number n such that P+(t+ n) = P0 = 0 while
for P+(t) > PK it is another number m which yields P+(t+m) = P1 = 0. It is
either a “Big Yes” to the truth at P1 = 1 or a “Big No” to it at P0 = 0. Both
n and m measure the required time at reaching a stable and final public
opinion. Their values depend on the {ai}, L and the initial value P+(t) .
Accordingly, public opinion is found to be non volatile. It stabilizes rather
quickly (n and m are usually small numbers) to a clear stand towards the
issue at stake.
4 Quantitative illustration
Figure 2 shows the variation of P+(t+1) as function of P+(t) for one particular
sets of the {ai} with a1 = 0, a2 = a3 = a4 = 1/3 and a5 = ... = aL = 0. There
PK = 0.847 which puts the required initial support to the truth to survive the
public debate, at a such very high value of more than 85%. Simultaneously
an initial minority above 15% to support the untruth is enough to produce
a final total blindness towards the truth. It is a very strong reversing anti-
democratic dynamics of opinion although made quite democratically.
To be more quantitative in above self-blinding dynamics let us consider
above ratio setting with an initial P+(t) = 0.80 at time t. The associated
series in time is P+(t + 1) = 0.78, P+(t + 2) = 0.77, P+(t + 3) = 0.73,
P+(t + 4) = 0.69, P+(t + 5) = 0.63, P+(t + 6) = 0.54, P+(t + 7) = 0.41,
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Figure 2: Variation of P+(t + 1) as function of P+(t) for the set a1 = 0,
a2 = a3 = a4 =
1
3
and a5 = ... = aL = 0. There PK = 0.847. Arrows show
the direction of the flow.
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P+(t+8) = 0.25, P+(t+9) = 0.09, P+(t+10) = 0.01 and eventually P+(t+
11) = 0.00. Eleven cycles of social local discussions have been enough to turn
an initial 80% of the population supporting the truth, toward an adhesion
to the untruth. They just merge quitely and freely with the initial 20% of
people who first believed to the untruth. Taking a basis of one discussion
a day on average, less than two weeks are enough to a total crystallization
of the lie against the obvious truth. Moreover a majority favoring the lie is
obtained already within six days.
Changing a bit the parameters will change both the Killing Point value
and the number of discussion cycles but yet preserving the basic asymmetry
and velocity of the process. Figure 3 shows the number of required discussion
cycles to get an initial 30% of layers to turn along their lie the 70% of the
population who first was convinced of the truth.
5 Conclusion
At this stage it is worth to stress that in real life situations not every person
is open to a mind change. Some fractions of the population will keep on their
opinion whatever happens. Including this effect in the model will not change
qualitatively the results. It will make the polarization process not total with
the two stable fixed points shifted towards respectively larger and smaller
values than zero and one.
It is also of interest to note that the doubting local state can yield on the
opposite view. For instance in the case of England, with a reversed cultural
skew towards America, it is the twenty percent of the lie supporters which
would have join in the initial majority of truth supporters, if the debate
would had been initiated.
Obviously, in reality, not every French person shares the skeptical Amer-
ican feeling we mentioned, and everyone does not change opinion with each
social meeting. But at the same time, a rumor does not need to reach hun-
dred percent of the population to become dangerous. In addition, other
choices of ratios, for the proportions of the various sizes of the social meet-
ings, would give other figures, but the tendency to self-propagation of the lie
would remain the same as long as the initial minority exceeds a certain value
threshold which is nevertheless always low in particualar due to the existence
of pair meetings.
We have revealed here tendencies in the dynamics of forming opinion,
11
0 5 10 15 20 Days
0.1
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Figure 3: Variation P+(t) as function of successive days with L = 6. The
initial value at t = 1 is P+(1) = 0.70. Long dashed line (1): a1 = 0, a2 =
1
2
,
a3 =
1
2
, a4 = a5 = a6 = 0 with PK = 1. Heavy thick line (2): a1 = 0.2,
a2 = 0.3, a3 = 0.2, a4 = 0.2, a5 = 0.1 and a6 = 0 with PK = 0.85. Other line
(3): a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = 0.2, a5 = a6 = 0.1. There PK = 0.74. Dashed line
(4): a1 = 0, a2 = 0.3, a3 = 0.7, a4 = a5 = a6 = 0 with PK = 0.71.
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and not an exact quantitative determination of any data. It is the phe-
nomenon itself, which must challenge us, more than the figures themselves.
We have shown how individual choices, hold from repeated open discussions
with friends and colleagues make the collective public opinion to align rather
quickly along some social paradigm hidden a priori commonly shared by the
group.
It can be instrumental to note that once launched, such a rumor prop-
agation can be stopped by non compromise institutional interventions. In
the example we took, it has been the solid and firm intervention of most
newspaper leader-editorialists, which put an end to the process of reversing
an obvious truth. In the case of the Holocaust deniers, it is the law which
made it.
In conclusion, when a rumor starts to develop, it shows the existence
at a majority of people of a cultural skewed a priori in the direction that
underlies the rumor. Therefore to avoid wrong and dangerous decisions, it
is of a central importance to question the apparent good sense of the social
democratic debate. In particular to keep in mind the illusionary character
of an individual choice driven from open discussions, can reveal essential in
preserving a country from collective misbehavior. The model may generalize
to a large spectrum of past rumors which did happened in various countries
in the world.
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